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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1958

CRIMINAL LAW
Right to Counsel-Waiver-Indigent Prisoners. In McClintock
v. Rhay,' a habeas corpus proceeding, the Washington Supreme Court
was presented with the problem whether an effective waiver of an
accused's right to the assistance of counsel may be withdrawn upon
request of the accused. After waiving his right to be represented by
counsel, petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of first degree forgery.
While a pre-sentence investigation was being conducted, petitioner
made a written request to the county prosecutor for the presence of
appointed counsel at the judgment proceeding and repeated the
request to the court when brought in for final judgment and sentencing. Both requests were denied, and judgment and sentence were
entered. From the state penitentiary, petitioner applied for a writ of
habeas corpus. Basing its opinion exclusively on the tenth amendment to the Washington constitution,2 the supreme court vacated
the judgment and sentence and ordered that petitioner be returned
to the superior court and that counsel be appointed.
The McClintock opinion proceeds from the assumption that when
brought before the superior court for judgment and sentencing the
accused had had a right to assistance of counsel, even after the admittedly effective waiver, and addresses itself only to the question
whether the right of an indigent prisoner to have court-appointed
counsel is co-extensive with an accused's right to be assisted by counsel.
Two points arise from this opinion: (1) reinstatement of the right
to counsel after an effective waiver of the right, and (2) the application of the tenth amendment to the Washington constitution to
such a right.
That an accused's right to counsel may be waived, provided the
waiver is intelligent and competent, is beyond question.' The matter
of withdrawal of such a waiver had not previously arisen in Washington, nor has it arisen in most other jurisdictions. There are a few
similar but distinguishable cases' in which, after waiver, no request
1 152 Wash. Dec. 544, 328 P.2d 369 (1958).

The tenth amendment provides in part the following:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person, or by counsel.... In no instance shall any accused person
before final judgment be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed.
'The most recent prior Washington cases on this point are Friedbauer v. State,
51 Wn.2d 92, 316 P.2d 117 (1957) ; In re Klapproth v. Squier, 50 Wn.2d 675, 314
P.2d 430 (1957) ; and In re Wilken v. Squier, 50 Wn.2d 58, 309 P.2d 746 (1957). See
also In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35 Wn.2d 849, 215 P.2d 880 (1950).
4 In Ex parte Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 108 P2d 10, 15 (1940), the accused had at
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for counsel was made of anyone until the court had convened and
the trial had, or was about to be, begun. In these cases the appellate
courts mentioned avoidance of unnecessary delay as a reason for
refusing to upset the convictions that followed refusal of the requests,
and suggested that had the requests been more timely the result
might have been different. In the McClintock case, the accused had
requested the appointment of counsel apparently well before judgment was to be rendered, thereby negativing any suspicion that he
was more interested in waging a delaying action than in being represented by counsel. On this ground the cases can be distinguished.
The fact that petitioner's first request was directed to the prosecuting attorney rather than to the court is probably of no importance,
in the absence of statutory provision indicating to whom the request,
if originated after arraignment, is to be made.5 It is a simple enough
matter to arrive at the view that the duties of the prosecuting attorney
as an officer of the court include relaying to the court an accused's
request for the appointment of, or for an opportunity to secure,
counsel. If this conclusion is accepted, it can be said that in the
McClintock case the request was timely and was not intended to
delay the judicial proceedings, and that the Washington position does
not differ from the other jurisdictions cited.
The Washington court, however, did not mention timeliness of
the request as a matter for consideration. It could be argued from
this case that waiver of the right to counsel may be withdrawn at
any time and that a request for a continuance, at any stage of a
criminal prosecution, must be granted if the accused wants to secure
arraignment waived his right to counsel and pleaded not guilty. At the subsequent
trial, the accused refused to reply to the judge's query about counsel and did not
demand counsel until given an opportunity to cross-examine the first witness for the

prosecution. Upon learning of the prior effective waiver, the trial judge refused to
grant a continuance until counsel had been obtained, and the accused was convicted.
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the California Supreme Court said of the
accused that "his attitude, both at that time [arraignment] and at the commencement
of the trial, was equivalent to a final declination of counsel..., and precluded him
from again raising the question when the trial was well under way." In State v.
Fowler, 59 Mont. 346, 196 Pac. 992 (1921), the accused refused counsel and pleaded
not guilty. Months later, the case came on for trial, and the accused's request for time
to obtain counsel was denied. It was held that the accused had had ample time to
procure counsel and that no constitutional right had been denied by refusing to delay
the trial.
See also State v. McKinnon, 41 Nev. 182, 168 Pac. 330 (1917).
5 RCW 10.40.030 deals with appointment of counsel for indigents at the time of
arraignment RCW 10.01.110 requires the appointment of counsel when an indigent
prisoner "shall be arraignedupon the charge that he has committed any felony," and
proceeds to the matter of compensation for such counsel. (Emphasis added.) RCW
10.46.050 is simply a re-phrasing of that portion of the tenth amendment dealing with
the right to be heard in person or by counsel and the right of compulsory process for
witnesses.
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the assistance of counsel. Adoption of this argument would place
Washington in a position contrary to that of those few other states
in which this question has arisen. The basis for the difference in
views is the value of expeditious judicial proceedings weighed against
insuring that the accused, when he desires it, may enjoy "the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him," 6 even
at the risk of having this safeguard abused.
Assuming with the court in the McClintock case that a waiver of
the right to counsel is effective only until counsel is requested, the
consideration is presented whether the tenth amendment can justifiably be construed to give all indigent prisoners a right to courtappointed counsel. After setting forth certain rights, including the
right to counsel, the amendment states that: "[I] n no instance shall
any accused person before final judgment be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed." From the
quoted passage the court decided, first, that "a defendant in a criminal
proceeding is an accused person until formal judgment and sentence
have been entered," 7 and, second, that an indigent accused person "is
entitled, under amendment 10, to have an attorney appointed at public
expense ....
I (Emphasis added.)
The tenth amendment does not distinguish between an indigent
prisoner and one who can afford privately enlisted counsel; the distinction is one made by the Washington court in this case. No attempt
was made to ground the distinction on any statute, although it is
possible to see in RCW 10.01.110' an ambiguity in the phrase "shall
be arraigned" which could be interpreted "shall have been arraigned."
It should be observed that the Federal Constitution is not applicable
in this situation. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not include a right to be appointed counsel in all cases,"
and the sixth amendment does not apply to proceedings in state
courts."
A literal reading of the Washington tenth amendment leads to
the conclusion that an accused person who cannot or will not pay
any fee to secure the assistance of counsel has a right to have counsel
6 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932), a case often cited and quoted on the
value of the right to counsel.
7
152 Wash. Dec. 544, 545, 328 P.2d 369, 370 (1958).
8
Ibid.
O Supra note 5.
10 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) ; Note, 30 WAsH. L. Rxv. 88 n. 7 (1954).
11 Betts v. Brady, ibid., cases cited n. 9.
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appointed to work for nothing until judgment has been rendered. It
is unlikely that such a novel meaning was intended.
An alternative interpretation is that given to the amendment in the
McClintock opinion: that the language of the amendment imperfectly states that an indigent accused person is entitled to have an
attorney appointed at public expense.
Largely because of the lack of supporting reasoning in the opinion,
the total effect of the McClintock case on Washington law is not
clear. That a timely request for the assistance of counsel must be
granted, even after the right has been waived, seems to be certain.
The broad language implying a right to secure counsel, either privately or through the court, at any moment in the proceedings, will
no doubt be modified when a request has been refused because it is
clearly a tactical stalling device. The extent of the modification (i.e.,
the willingness to tolerate delay in criminal proceedings) cannot be
ascertained from the McClintock case.
TiMOTHY R. CLiFoR
Aiding and Abetting Distinguished-Effect of Knowledge. In
State v. Hinkley1 the accused had been convicted of aiding and abetting the commission of a crime. The correctness of the trial judge's
instructions regarding the term "abet" I was affirmed by the supreme
court, which said:
Although the word "aid" does not imply guilty knowledge or felonious intent, the word "abet" includes knowledge of the wrongful
purpose of the perpetrator...

The construction of "aid" was unnecessary in this case, and is
therefore dictum. But, in the light of the Washington statute, it is
dangerous dictum. RCW 9.01.030 makes punishable as a principal
every person "concerned" in the commission of a crime, whether he
participates directly or "aids or abets." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, if "aid" does not imply guilty knowledge or felonious intent,
one who innocently aids a criminal is as guilty under the statute as
one who knows the use to which his aid will be put. Surely the legislature did not intend this result.
1152 Wash. Dec. 356, 325 P.2d 889 (1958).
2 The instructions were:
[B]efore you can find the defendant Hinkley guilty of aiding and abeting..., you must first find that he, the said Hinkley, did so knowingly
and with criminal intent. To abet another in the commission of a crime
implies a consciousness of guilt in instigating, encouraging, promoting or
aiding in the commission of such criminal offense. (Emphasis added.)
3 152 Wash. Dec. 356, 358, 325 P.2d 889, 891 (1958).
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The definition adopted in the Hinkley case was based on the California cases cited therein.4 The California Penal Code makes punishable as principals all persons who "aid and abet" in the commission
of a felony.' (Emphasis added.) Under a statute using the conjunctive, it is immaterial that cognizance of guilt is an element of only
one of the acts. In both California cases cited in the Hinkley opinion,
it was observed that aiding without abetting (i.e., without guilty
knowledge) is not a crime.
Even with a statute using the conjunctive, the California court has
not been consistent in its view that aiding does not require knowledge
of a wrongful purpose, stating in other cases6 that an aider or abettor
would be guilty only if he acted with knowledge or intent.
From the foregoing it can be seen that the cases cited to support
the holding in the Hinkley case are inapposite, because they deal with
different statutory language, because they do not abrogate knowledge
of wrongful purpose as a requirement for conviction, and because they
are modified by statements in other cases which are inconsistent
with them.
One way to avoid punishing the innocent with the guilty under
RCW 9.01.030 (and it is certain that a way will be found) is to
construe "concerned" in the statute in such a way that it excludes
those who do not have knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the
perpetrator.
An alternative solution is that employed by California in Barrett
v. Board of Osteopathic Examiners.7 A statute' defined unprofessional conduct for a physician, in part, as "aiding or abetting" an
unlicensed person to practice medicine. The opinion reversing the
revocation of a physician's license says that a literal interpretation
of the statute would lead to a conviction of innocent persons and
that:
While it cannot be assumed that the terms were intended to be used
in the conjunctive, it must be assumed that it was not the intention
of the legislature to make the mere "aiding" in the act a violation of
the law unless such aid be wrongfully and knowingly extended. 9
4 People v. Terman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 345, 40 P.2d 915 (1935), and People v. Dole, 122

Cal. 486, 55 Pac. 581 (1898).
5 CAL. PENAL CODE § 31.
0 People v. Beltran, 94 Cal. App. 2d 197, 210 P.2d 238 (1949) ; People v. Doble, 203
Cal. 510, 265 Pac. 184 (1928).
74 Cal. App. 2d 135, 40 P.2d 923 (1935).
8 CAL. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE § 2392.
9 4 Cal. App. 2d 135, 40 P.2d 923, 925 (1935).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 34

The result is the same: "aid" imputes no knowledge; "aiding," unmodified, is not criminal, regardless of what the statute says; to be
criminal, "aid" must include knowledge of the wrongful purpose of
the perpetrator.
A third solution, the simplest and the most direct, is to refuse to
be influenced by the dictum in the Hinkley case.
TIMOTHY R. CLIFFoRD
DAMAGES
Damages for Mental Suffering Resulting from Breach of Contract. In Carpenterv. Moore' an unusual aspect of the law of contract
damages was re-examined by the Washington Supreme Court. Since
the emergence of Hadley v. Baxendale,2 the rule has been that damages are allowed for only those injuries that the defendant had reason
to foresee as a probable result of his breach at the time the contract
was made. One of the postulates to evolve from the Hadley rule was
that in breach of contract actions, damages for mental suffering are
not allowable.' The issue raised in the Carpenter case was whether
this aforementioned postulate ought to be followed strictly, or whether
to allow exceptions in certain cases involving contracts of such nature
that it was foreseeable at the time the contract was made that mental
anguish would result from a breach of such contract.
The controversy in the Carpenter case arose in the following manner: The defendant, a dentist, agreed to make partial plates for the
plaintiff, and he expressly guaranteed that all of the work would be
done to her satisfaction. The agreed price for the plates was four
hundred dollars. The plates did not fit the plaintiff's mouth properly,
causing her pain and discomfort. They also caused growths to appear
that had to be removed by a surgeon. The plaintiff sued on grounds
of malpractice but failed to prove negligence on the part of the
dentist. The trial court allowed the pleadings to be amended to an
action for breach of contract. Judgment for the plaintiff included
four hundred dollars as the price paid for the partial plates and seven
hundred and fifty dollars for plain and suffering. On appeal the
judgment was modified, deleting the damages for pain and suffering.
It may first be observed that the Carpentercase did not present the
1 51 Wn.2d 795, 322 P.2d 125 (1958).

2 9 Exch. 341 (1854).

ARobinson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 24 Ky.L.Rep. 452, 68 S.W. 656 (1902);
Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).

